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For some three thousand years the political, social, and economic relationships o f the 
Maghrib have depended largely on the Mediterranean,1 on whether the sea was friendly 
or hostile, whether it might at any given moment bring friends or enemies, traders or 
raiders. Phoenicians sailing via Cyprus founded Carthage at the end o f the ninth 
century B.C.,2 and the earliest treaties between Carthage and Rome, conventionally 
dated to 509 and 348 B.C., envisage Carthaginian raids by sea on central Italy as a 
normal event.3 Raiding and trading reinforced each other. Archeological evidence 
shows Carthage importing pottery and luxury goods from Greece and exporting her 
own manufactures and agricultural surpluses, particularly to Spain and southern Italy.4 
Punic vessels sailed out through the Straits o f Gibraltar to travel north and south along 
the Adantic coasts.5 The sea routes throughout Antiquity far outweighed in 
commercial importance the land routes along the coast or into and across the Sahara, 
and when Carthage fell to the Vandals in A.D. 439, it was the first but not the last 
time that it succumbed to an army unsupported by a fleet.
After the Third Punic War destroyed Punic Carthage in 146 B.C., for nearly six 
centuries Africa was part o f Rome’s unified Mediterranean empire, and a resurrected 
Carthage became the second city of the Latin-speaking West. Even when the western 
provinces began to fall apart under the pressure of German tribes in the late fourth 
and early fifth centuries, the province of Africa still seemed stable and secure, until in
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A.D. 429 the Vandals crossed the Straits o f Gibraltar in requisitioned transport, 
probably no more than small fishing boats, meeting no opposition, and advanced 
eastwards along the coast, taking Carthage in 439.6 Now once more, as in Punic days, 
a fleet from Carthage might threaten Italy, and still more urgendy Sicily, and the 
Vandal king Geiseric showed that this was no empty threat by attacking Sicily the 
following year. He failed to take Panormus (Palermo), but succeeded in capturing 
Lilybaeum (Marsala). The panic that ensued in Rome proved justified when Geiseric 
invaded Italy and sacked the city in 455, carrying off to Africa numerous high-ranking 
officials and the spoils o f the Temple o f Jerusalem, which had been in Rome for nearly 
four centuries. At all times, a power which holds North Africa and has bases in Sicily 
must be considered a potential threat to central Italy, not only in 509 B.C. or in A.D. 
455, but still in 1943—witness the Allied invasion.
Imperial power had already shifted from Rome to Constantinople (Byzantium), 
but it took until 533 for the Byzantines to reconquer Africa, and even then they were 
content to occupy an area only one-tenth o f what Rome had once held, leaving the 
rest to tribal confederations which in many ways did not differ significandy from those 
that had existed in this area before Rome came.7 The strength of the tie now established 
between Carthage and Constantinople is clearly demonstrated by the events of 608- 
610, when it was Carthage that hatched the plot to depose the usurper Phocas. 
Heraclius, exarch of Africa, first o f all moved to cut off supplies o f African wheat and
oil from the capital in 608, and the troops at his disposal were reinforced by expensively 
recruited Berber volunteers to form an army with which Heraclius’ nephew Nicetas 
invaded Egypt and took Alexandria in 609. Then, in 610, the merchant fleets o f Africa 
and Egypt were pressed into service to carry troops against Constantinople itself, 
Phocas was abandoned by his ministers and dismembered by the populace, and the 
exarch o f Africa’s son, the younger Heraclius, was crowned emperor, one of the 
greatest rulers in Byzantine history, destined to triumph over the Persian Empire and 
to be eternally remembered, as by the Turkish lover in Flecker’s poem:
Banish then, O Grecian eyes, the passion o f the waiting West!
Shall God’s holy monks not enter on a day God knoweth best
To crown the Roman king again and hang a cross upon his breast?
And a thousand swinging steeples shall begin as they began
When Heraclius rode home from the wrack of Ispahan...
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His long reign of over thirty years was a turning point of history: "It was now 
that the Roman period ended and Byzantine history properly speaking began. 
Emphasis on the Greek element and the strength of ecclesiastical influence combined 
to give the Empire a new appearance ... Greek, the medium of the people and the 
Church, became the official language of the Byzantine Empire ... and by the next 
generation a knowledge of Latin was rare, even in educated circles."8 This alone could 
not have failed to alienate Africa from the eastern Empire, since there the cultural and 
linguistic tide had set in the opposite direction, and already in St Augustine's day, 
some two centuries before, the knowledge of Greek was dying out, even among the 
educated classes. The linguistic division was mirrored also in theological disputes. But 
there was a new factor to be considered: by one of the supreme ironies of history, the 
same year which saw the opening of the Byzantine victories over the Persians also 
marked the start of the Muslim era, the year of the Hijra or Hegira, with consequences 
infmitely more far-reaching for the Maghrib than a mere change in the official language 
of the Byzantine Empire. 
The story of the first wave of Mus lim expansion is soon told. The great campaigns 
ofHeraclius had broken Sassanid power and left the Persian Empire in chaos, but the 
Byzantines had spent their resources without stint and needed a period of recuperation, 
which they were denied. By 634 the Arabs were advancing through Byzantine 
territory, and two years later they routed the Byzantine army at Jarmuk. Syria and its 
capital Antioch surrendered without a fight, then the Persian Empire collapsed and 
with it went Byzantine Mesopotamia, the Arabs attacked Egypt, and on 29 September 
642, after a negotiated Byzantine evacuation, the Arab general 'Amr b. Al-'As entered 
Alexandria in triumph. He then pushed on westwards along the coast, reaching and 
sacking the Tripolitanian cities ofOea and Sabratha (642/3), although this headlong 
and seemingly irresistible advance was delayed, first by 'Amr's recall, and then after 
his reinstatement by the need to recapture Alexandria which a Byzantine expedition 
had retaken. Alexandria was once again in Muslim hands by the summer of 646, never 
to be relinquished thereafter, and the way to Africa lay wide open. Africa was already 
on the verge of schism from Constantinople,. and it would be hard to say whether 
military, political, or theological considerations, or just personal ambition, played the 
greater part in persuading the current exarch of Africa, Gregory, late in 646 or early 
in 647, to proclaim himself emperor. 
Carthage and its hinterland, cut off by Gregory’s proclamation from hope of 
friendly succour by sea, were again, just two centuries later, facing an invader coming 
in along the coast, though now from the east, rather than the west. Gregory moved 
his army down to SbeMa (Sufetula) to meet the threat, but an Arab force estimated 
at twenty thousand men first o f all raided northwards into the steppeland where later 
the Arab capital o f Kairouan was to be built, and then on its way back into Tripolitania 
encountered Gregory’s forces, defeated them, and slew Gregory (647). Sbeftla was 
sacked, but the Arabs accepted a bribe, or tribute, to persuade them to withdraw to 
Cyrenaica without establishing a base in Africa itself.
The ensuing years saw further raids, but not until 669 was an attempt made to 
conquer Africa for good, leading in 670 to the foundation of Kairouan as a permanent 
base. Its site, says Ibn Khaldun, was chosen simply with a view to “pasturage for their 
camels and nearness to the desert and the caravan routes,”9 and its location suggests 
that the Arabs had in mind as potential enemies not so much the Byzantines as the 
Berbers, who loom large in the history o f the next thirty years or so. The Byzantines 
for a time held onto their coastal possessions, but no more. ‘Amr had disapproved of 
naval activity, describing the sea as “a great creature upon which weak creatures ride, 
like worms on a piece of wood,”10 and although the Arabs since his day had acquired 
a fleet, they concentrated their naval efforts on Constantinople itself, rather than on 
the coasts of Africa. But when the Arabs took Carthage in 695 and the Byzantine fleet 
appeared to recapture it, Arab reinforcements arrived by sea and by land, and Carthage 
again fell, finally, in 698. Constantinople made no further effort to intervene, and, in 
711, the last Byzantine outpost in the Maghrib—Septem (Ceuta) on the Straits of 
Gibraltar—opened its gates.
In studying the succeeding period, we have two problems. The first is “the fact 
that the earliest extant works in Arabic date from the end o f the eighth century A.D., 
and that the written tradition to which they belong cannot be considered to be much 
earlier than the middle of that century,”11 and the second, as I myself am all too acutely 
aware, that scholars who know Greek and Latin, and who can thus cope with the 
Byzantine sources, rarely know Arabic, and vice versa, except for those lucky enough 
to combine Arabic as the mother tongue with a classical education.12 The result is to 
accentuate the discontinuity that the Arab invasion brought about. The following 
comment on the Arab conquest o f Spain is equally applicable to North Africa:
The nature o f the linguistic divide between periods in which Latin and then 
Arabic constitute the dominant languages of the sources o f historical evidence 
is so great that the Islamic conquest marks as much a caesura in modern 
scholarship as it did in the development of society in the peninsula in the 
eighth century. To put it simply, historians of Visigothic Spain do not study 
Arab Spain, and the orientalists who have worked on the history o f Al- 
Andalus have not ventured into the previous period. The consequence has 
been that for the relatively few who have worked on Spain in the period of 
Islamic domination their views on the preceding Visigothic kingdom have 
come at second hand., .and if in consequence their views on that society have 
been scarcely more sophisticated than those of St Boniface, who is to blame 
them...? One major casualty of this misleading historiographical perspective 
has been any sense of continuity across the period o f the Arab and Berber 
invasion.13
The Arab invasions did not in fact mark as abrupt a break between Africa and 
Europe as the now almost classical Pirenne thesis suggests. Hodges and Whitehouse 
have concluded in their recent confrontation o f the thesis with the archeological 
evidence that not only western Europe, but the Mediterranean world as well, began 
to experience severe economic decline even before the Arab invasions, and that “the 
creation of an Islamic empire in the later seventh and early eighth centuries was partly 
a product, not a cause, o f the economic transformations detected by Pirenne.” 4̂ For 
the Maghrib, the Arab conquest caused the east-west links along the coast to become 
more important, politically, militarily, and commercially, than those across the 
Mediterranean. Carthage was virtually abandoned, to the profit o f Tunis, because its 
coastal position left it too exposed.15
Quite simply, the shape o f the world has changed, and it is in this reshaping of 
the mental map, of the intellectual and imaginative perception of the geography of the 
whole Mediterranean world, and of the Middle East and of western Europe as well, 
that the rise of Islam has its greatest and most lasting impact. For the Roman poet 
Horace towards the end of the last century B.C., the Parthian Empire was exotic, and 
central Asia the stuff of vague poetic evocation; for Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, 
in the fourteenth century Khurasan and Transoxania are an integral part o f his own 
scientific and intellectual world.16 From what perspective does each of us look at the 
map of the world today? And to what extent is our geographical and historical
orientation still influenced by the great medieval division between Christendom and 
Islam!1 For most o f us, I suspect, the influence is greater than we realise.
M y  own experience is not perhaps untypical. The map o f the pre-Reformation world 
to which I was exposed some fifty years ago as a schoolboy in England was one which 
Charlemagne would have been at home with: after the “Decline and Fall” and the 
“Dark Ages” which followed, the centre of civilisation shifted to northwest Europe 
and the only history o f the next few centuries that counted was that of the wars between 
England and France. O f course there was a Pope, but he only existed in order to lay 
England under an interdict from time to time or to squabble over who got the right 
to appoint the Archbishop o f Canterbury. Byzantium was a faraway place o f which 
we knew nothing, and Saracens were there to occupy the Holy Sepulchre so that 
Crusaders might go out rather splendidly to try to get it back. The Saracens were pretty 
much the same as the Moors, against whom Roland had died so nobly, sounding his 
horn, like Robin Hood, and they were in Spain until chased out by Ferdinand and 
Isabella. Admittedly this version owes something to Osbert Lancaster’s The Saracen’s 
Head and to 1066 and All That, but this only reinforces my point. Perhaps I was 
abnormally retarded in my intellectual development, but it was not until I read Hugh 
Trevor-Roper’s The Rise of Christian Europe that I realised just how distorted this 
eurocentric version was,17 and began to understand that in many ways the Arab world, 
not medieval Europe, was the heir o f Greece and Rome, and that it was the Crusaders 
who were the barbarians.18
And yet, if we return to the eighth and ninth centuries, though the mental focus 
has shifted and the nexus between Carthage or Tunis and anywhere in Europe has 
been broken, we see the old geopolitical imperatives gradually reasserting themselves. 
It was in 827 that the Aghlabid amir Ziyadat Allah I invaded Sicily, and the island 
once again became a base for raids on the Italian mainland, including one in which 
Rome was attacked and St Peter’s sacked (846), although it took three-quarters o f a 
century before the Muslim conquest o f Sicily was complete (902). Its importance to 
the Arabs was made all the clearer in the course o f the eleventh century, when they 
lost it to the Normans, who by 1091 controlled the whole island, from which they in 
their turn attacked Africa, until by 1148 they had taken Tripoli, Djerba, Gabes, 
Mahdia, and Sfax, until an Almohad army from Morocco invaded Tunisia and expelled 
the Normans, whose last stronghold, Mahdia, fell in January 1160.19
After the disruption caused by the Arab invasions and their need to consolidate 
their hold upon the Maghrib, it took some time before trade across the Mediterranean 
gradually picked up again, and it remains uncertain how much North African trade 
reached Europe via Muslim Spain and how much across the Mediterranean seaways. 
In the ninth and tenth centuries, however, Duby points out that the evidence for the 
south of France indicates “la permanence d’un commerce à longue distance d’objets 
précieux,” alongside that of “un cabotage le long des côtes, même aux pires moments 
de la menace sarrasine.”20 Trading and raiding in fact went hand-in-hand, as they were 
to do for centuries, from ports on both sides of the Mediterranean, and as they had 
done since Homer’s day. The crew that peacefully unloaded its cargo in one port to 
exchange it by way of trade was not normally averse to turning a little extra profit by 
landing and looting the undefended settlement or farmhouse round the next headland, 
if occasion offered. One man’s pirate is another’s peaceful trader.21 What is difficult is 
to estimate the volume of trade and its relationship to other forms of exchange: 
“L’important serait surtout de repérer les variations de rhythme de l’activité 
marchande, de les situer exactement par rapport aux soubresauts de la vie militaire. Ce 
qui, dans l’état de la documentation, n’est pas possible.”22 Raiders coming from Spain 
even established a Muslim enclave at Fraxinetum in the territory of Fréjus, possibly 
towards the end of the ninth century, from which raids devastated the countryside 
throughout the next century.23 We should not forget that piracy, raiding, and trade 
are all exchange mechanisms tending to the redistribution o f wealth.24
Among the goods which North Africa had to offer were those imported from 
beyond the Sahara, from regions with which trade had never before been so important, 
despite the wealth that Lepcis Maior and the other Tripolitanian cities derived from 
it in the Roman period.25 From the second half of the ninth century to the end of the 
fifteenth, the Maghrib had a monopoly of this trade, to the point where it has been 
claimed, with only slight exaggeration, that among the North African states of this 
period “the heart—the ‘core’—of each state was a great commercial city which was a 
terminus for the Saharan caravans and a place where Christian and Middle Eastern 
merchants congregated.”26 The tenth century in particular appears to have been a 
period of great prosperity:
Large areas which had fallen derelict were, thanks to the introduction of
elaborate systems of irrigation, once more under cultivation. The olive was
again cultivated on a very large scale. Kairwan was producing sugar, Msila 
cotton, Sebab indigo, Gabes silk. The manufacture o f cotton and woollen 
cloths and pottery was restoring to Tripoli, Sfax, and Tunis their former 
prosperity. In the west the coral fisheries of Ceuta and Tenes were again 
active. But probably the most profitable trade was that which the Maghrib 
was carrying on with the Sudan, whence slaves, ivory, ebony, and gold dust 
were imported.27
Whether the fourteenth-century Muslim historians who blamed the Banu Hilal 
for the destruction o f this prosperity were right is not something which I propose to 
discuss here. Ibn Khaldun, of course, has no doubts: Africa, he says, in the da)« of the 
Aghlabids “had some sedentary culture as the result of the luxury and prosperity of 
the royal authority and the large civilisation of al-Qayrawan... (but) the Hilal, who 
were Arab Bedouins, gained power over the country and ruined it.”28 We must here 
allow for the age-old prejudice against the nomad, o f which Ibn Khaldun has a full 
share.29 Poncet, however, argued that economic decline had already set in, and that 
the worst o f the devastation was caused, not by the tribesmen, but by “marauding 
bands not related to them... as well as by the rulers in the course of chastising rebellious 
groups.”30 There is at least evidence to suggest that Ibn Khaldun may have exaggerated 
the completeness o f the destruction, although the dependence of agriculture in many 
parts o f the Maghrib on irrigation, or at least on measures designed to ensure the 
maximum conservation o f the scanty and seasonally ill-distributed rainfall, makes the 
region singularly vulnerable.
It is hard to assess what life in the countryside was like, and how much continuity 
there was, over this period. Modem scholars once gave the Romans all the credit for 
the visible extant remains o f hydraulic engineering in the region, but Shaw, although 
he focuses more on pre-Roman developments than post-Roman, nonetheless cites al- 
Bakri to show that “neither the retreat o f Roman authority nor the arrival of Arab 
invaders changed local patterns o f  life,” and concludes that “whatever the fate o f 
individual isolated communities after the end of the Roman period, Arabic sources 
from the Middle Ages attest the continued existence and success o f these (irrigation) 
systems in general all along the length of the ‘frontier5 regions south o f the Saharan 
Adas.”31 Nor was it only a question o f “continued existence,” since new irrigation 
systems were developed to facilitate the cultivation of the new sugar cane crop, which
was the Arabs’ major contribution to Mediterranean agriculture.32 Even for the Roman 
period, however, the archeology o f the countryside has been virtually ignored,33 while 
archeological evidence for the early Islamic period is still more conspicuously lacking, 
even since independence. The French colonial attitudes whereby they identified 
themselves with the Romans in the Maghrib and dismissed the whole Muslim period 
as “des siècles de barbarie” unworthy of study still cast a nefarious shadow.34
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